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through more informal, consensual
Finally, the case studies' findings will be related to the
guiding hypothesis: l.e. that a change in these structures
has to be understood crl.S1S. rnl... .:1II-LS
will a IJrief Ol-lt.look on current. st.ruc-
t. iJ.r a.l ~l..._ TT'" _ •• ~_l.J.!e U~,.::» .. cJ,U.. LlJ .:._-l •• ..-~ _~lllU',),~')LLy ,.
11. The Causes of Decline
The er 1.S 1.S became evident
when restrietion was met with a
deflationary policy of extremely high interest rates and an
over-valued Its major companies reported lasses
t.hat. were
beginnings Il0wever; ~ -._ l... ....'_:cU! IJt'
business.
traced back to·
the first oil price shock ln the early 1970s when a
dramatic lncrease ir! +-L._l.1I t' demand for small cars coincided
with the elosing of the productivity gap between U.S. and
Japanese auto __ 1. _Hld"-t'L::::i. This shift in consumer preferences
and the intensified international competition represent the
new environment for the domestic car industry.
II A. Shifts in Consümer Preferences
Until the oil embargo of 1973/74 consumer preferences were
surprisingly predictable. The annual face-lifting was in
essence Iittle more than a sales incentive in a saturated
market. mL. _1. I! t' basic concept and mechanical components
remained much the same. Mainly, the American automobiles
became only longer (from 1974: from 197.5 in. to
222.7in.), heavier (3,145 Ib. to 4,389lb.), stronger I", t: c\L.1.U.J
I_
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11 B. The New Global
SerlOLJ58stablish themselves as
rnl... tf
!!.1Lee first postwar years. The large
financial requi~enlents for ajl efficj.enr sass production and
the substantiaJ_ economies--of-scale ~n t~p nrganization of
sales and services proved to be






_ ~ ~ 1-. _ _,_
1 I j_ l._: .:. 1 e -.L t 1
In4) r but l;~t.pr they l:---,+r-n(.iicpd, wi+-},
arJle success f t.'heir cJwr~ "cOfüpacts"
r-,'L.. _ r-, _ ~__ • -.. .: __ \
'._ut::'vy ,.,ULVd..l.L1 •
The same procedure was TRDRr1t~c:! f~lur 1na t.he s~corlrl wave of
- -.1. -- -- -- - - - - - - - -- - -- .J - - .- - - - -
imports at +..1... ...J ~.c +..1-_ 1nrn_.,. •• ..:+..1... .J-L_ 1-_1 _ _ -C +..1-_ "-.. •• 1-L!l~ ~!lt--l UJ_ l-J.!e J."':1UU::-i. W_Ll·!t l·Ile !!e_Lp U..L L.l!e ~UU-
compacts" (e~g~ Ford Pinto) ..&_1... ..... __ ~_l ...... ..&_ ~1... ..... -C .: __ ..... _..&_ __ ~ ... _ .....l.tle !UdL Ke L. :::'!ld.1. e UL ..L!UPU1. L.:,:) Wcl~
about. 9 per ...... - - ..&-l..:elll.• Fr()m , nr"J() __ 1... __ ... ~ ...... __.L'7flJ Ull f Iluwt::'ve.L,
short.ages imports conquered everfueled by
increasing
- .: 1UJ.....L
_ ..... _1,_ .... ~1... --.
H1d.LJ<..t::'l- ::;lId.lt::'~,
•• _ .... .:1 .... 1... _
Ullt,._l...L 1..l.!ey reached 27 per cent in
, no ,
.L :7 O.L • These high levels _-CU1. import penetration, __ 1... .: _1... ._ ~WILLl;1I we.L1:'
not compensated by a equal number _L __ • .... L_ •• _...Jl_ ...U.L I:'lI.}'U.L l-::; I p.L lJ.LVUIlU..lY
destabilized the ..&_ __ ...J':..&_': 1 1._ .... ..&_l-.L aU.L L.J.U!ld..L HlaL "'I:' l- öl. L ClII'jt::'I!!t::'1! l-. WIlile at
first these new competitive conditions only governed the
lower market segments, t.oday foreign products compete
successfully in all markets except for the specifically
automobiles set the I ... T 't7 __ 1. rn.: _\l'feW IUl. K. 1. ..LHLe~
P •• ------
.e, U1. U pedlllllXl...lryttsta_ndard"American
3 Extremely important for its süccess Wcl~
Volkswagen I s emphasis U'I a11 efficient sales and service
network (Rae 1984; 120). FIAT and Renault may have failed
to penetrate the U.S9 market because they did not develop
such a service organization.
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Increasingly imports derives
frorn WC)1~klna:r1ship - - -'Oll Cl superior driving abilities
But while these product
guality wjth substantiallyproducers manage
A '7 \
'± I J ~
T:'l~._~ __
_I:. U~ U'pe I Japanese
variOUS studies on




na doubts exist that the Japanese enjoy a substantial cost
_ .J. +-_~~
dlJ.VctJ!t_ctlje,
Japanese vary fram $
aser ibed to tfle
The
fol.lowing factors are generally mentioned as explanatory
TT __ ~ _~_ ....... _.





var.iation 1-._ ...... __ ._j.)t-_~ l._ weeJ I
in 1981 of the American
cited by Flynn
and 60 percent for
var iOllS years () A \.., '±!
Organization
new system the division üf labor that combines the
functions of production, quality inspection, and repair in
one job .. Considerable savings of indirect labor derive
from these practices. using comparable
production technology Japanese producers are +- -'_. '-'







Ul..-~~---_ ....1-' t:' L '~t:' 11 I.65
()\
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The International Automobile Program estimates that
the U,S,-Japan production
smaller car exceeds $1;500
_1 1l'\Olla 1CC\
cl.L -L':'Ott~ -L:J~JJ ~
cost difference on a typical
(at 215 yeti = $ 1) (Altshuler et
During t.he same
the Japa_nes yen ..
1 __ ....
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competition" (Altshuler et al 1 (84) are further enhanced by
technological advances. Computer aided design and manufac-
t t 1-.-l 1,-.7\ -n./rt 1\. ... ,)ure me 110US \'-."t"\L) ' __ t"\l.l, in combination with electronic data
exchanges diminish the traditional information disparities
between the assembler and the supplier~ Obviously, better
communications simplify the difficult task of coordinating
the complex process of JOlnlng thousands of parts to-
7\ __ ":_
t1.\j ct .-LI! , this reduces .:_'1- ....... _.: _1 ......ill11el.elll. 1.i:::>"'::> and,
the costs of ~ __ 1. _ .......lllo.1.J<-el. coordinated transactions.
Although no quantitative data on the changes
....... _----- ....... ..:_- --_ ....... -
L.ld11:::>o.CLiVll '';V::>l.::> of markets are available (arId are
probably extremely difficult ta cal.culate), it appears that
these changes in the competitive and technological environ-
ment of the auto
t.iorl -~V 1..




___ 1.-. ....... _
llldl. ..... eL::>. As a consequence vertical integratiün __ ..J 1.-.J-o.llU !l!o.l.!<-eL
relations become more interchangeable as mechanisms for the
coordination of the production
of vertical integration have
_1- _ ..:_
'_;l1o...l11 • the costs
Vertical
integration converts irlto fixed T .....l l.
commits more capital to the success ..... .& ~l-_ &..: __V.L l.11e .Li-llll. The emer-
gen ce -~V.l .& - ~- ~ .: --.lVl.t:'..l':J11 low-cost producers has certainly
increased risks for t:he "Bi.g fTll-~_ ..... ".l111.ee • T ....-l ,~ frees capital
c
























































































non-competitive vis-a-vis non-union suppliers or other
independent suppliers who enjoyed more favorable collective
bargaining agreements. 20 many instances in-house
products were not only more expensive but also of poorer
quality for reasons explained in part 111 C. ,. .... 1-_ tr n ..:_l-n l.!lt: D-Llj
Ttlree' 5" of new supply sources four different
strategies can be identified besides the already described
process of farming out to low cost domestic parts manufac-
t llrers :
(1) The "Southern Strategy"; This strategy implied the
of parts from Northern,
"right-tCl-ir! thebuilt plants........... -~_.,--I_U llt:W-Ly
systematic
Midwestern plants
work" South. 21 Although pursued most aggressively by the
cash-loaded GM, which even opened a non-union new assembly
plant in Oklahoma, this strategy provided only for abrief
per iod of rr __ ~,.:-...~"1. t-~l..Ltl.. 111 1979 the T T n T. TUl"\\1'1 managed to obtain an
agreement automatie certification _-COJ....
the UAW at all new production facil.ities which were related
to the production of automobiles. In 1982 GM agreed also
to recognize the UAW as the exclusive bargaining agent
where ever 51 percent of a bargaining unit had signed NLRB
cards (GlY1-UAW 1982: 1) ~ By all _-CUL G~11 5 11 SeJll the rn
Strategy" plants were organized by the UAW (Ward's Aütomo-
tive Report. 1 c: c: \J~~J~JJ ..
{2} The "in-bound" strategy: The extremely low wages in
Mexico attracted many American companies to set up plants
just for the purpose of supplying the US-market~ GM alone
20 Although the UAW enforces a homogeneous wage level
among the assembler and the major supplier companies
through pattern bargaining, WdilY suppliers enjoy contracts
wi th li)wer wage rates (Köhler lmd Sengenberger 1983: 415) .
21 The Southern and t.he ?y1(1)11ta.in states incereased
their share of total domestic employment in the automobile
industry by al)oüt 50 ~; bet.ween 1973 clnd 1980 (calculated 011
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mentioned T"\ ..... _1,. ..... ~-lrdl~!<.d.L lA _ 1 __ .J-p-Ldl!l. ln
T,T ..... _
V\/d.L.L~II, Ohio, the
membership of the International Union of Electrical Workers
Local 717 voted for a two-tiered wage system in December of
, n n ...
.L::>O'±. The contract guarantees the then existing ---, ---.- ..... -t'IllP-LUY~~:::>
virtual lifetime income and job security, but new employees
were only entitled to 55 percent of the base rate in the
first year .. This vote came about after approximately 4,600
jobs had __ ..JdllU fürther "':_1-J '-.-}JJ los ses were
threatened (RllSSO 1985: The neighboring Chrysler plant
soon followed suit h.I __ .J-l-l __ T .... l-. __ T"'l .... __ ': l\ •• _ 10nc. AO\\1'1 U Il \,1 LL Y .L, cH) U .L 1'<. t: V -L t: W t"\. U':l. .L::> 0 J; '±::> J •
Another case was GM's Hyatt Roller Bearing Plant in Clark,
"'1' ..... _
1'1lt'W u~.L :::>t:y • Faced with a plant closing announcement,
worktorce bought out GM. On the basis of substantially
reduced fringe benefits and liberalized work rules they
continued to supply GM, which continued to hold a sizeable
amount ()f stock in the new company Ir'I..: , nnt:. , "l 1 ~\ 22\u.l..l1ye~ 1. ~O~j; .l...)- 1. UJ •
A necessary condition for
that the threat to elose a plant lS real.
of instances, the refusal Gf warkers to concede work rule
changes and pay reductions was met with immediate plant
closure (Easterbrook 1983) .
T:''L. ..: , .....
V'ilLL-Lt: wage premiums for UAW ___1-~~_Hlt'!lIlJt:.L ::. represent an
: __ .... _..I--= ... ~,.. ,c ......_
..Ll1l~el1 L...1.. ve ilJl. oütsoürcing , 23 tt1e ~~_.: __ r_ .... ..1- ....... 1- 1-. __ 1-. ..... __UILLU!l ~. :::> l..L ~!lY l.il !ld:::> Ut:t'11
a potential barrier to a further reduction in the degree of
vertical integration~ Outsourcing became a top priority
issue with the UAW (Buss 1 n n A \J~~OLf:J" Al ttl0 llgtl ._':..1-1- •• __ ..... _..1- ..... ..:_W-Ll.lI UllCt'.Ll.d-Lll
success, the UAW has tried to curb this practice through
collective bargaining agreements. One ......c.c __ ",- L.. .........t:LLlJ.L l· lld:::>
consisted of a JOB-Bank ..1-1-. ............ 'L., ..... __l.lId l.'.Ic;l.~ _~_ .... ..I- __ ....... _.-l _1' ...: ..... L.. ..... 1 __ ..I-pLUl.t'Cl.t'u d~-L JUU~ -LU::'l.
due to outsourcing. Warkers in this "BatIk 11 tlave received










23 About 37 % above t.he a.verage for manutacturing
excluding fringe benefits (calculated on the basis
, no r:. 0 , -. _.-l "'l n." J\ 1 no A. r r'] \
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Not surprisingly groups and committees were
being set up by the assemblers for the purpose of courting
the active support of the suppliers for ..1-1..._,,: __ , __ ~""-_l-lle3-1. 1-'3-<111::> l-V
transform the entire industry. The activities include huge
conferences on the new shape of the estab-
lishment of a supplier council called "Partners in Confor-
"mance , suppliers are invited air their
problems (lron Age 9-6-85) ,35 and the creation of joint
study groups such as
the indüstry's trade
..1-1....-. 1\ T 1\,..,
l_ 11 e t-\ 1. t-\ lJ •
j ourrlals r
The assemblers also rely on
which generally supports the
envisaged changes in the name of improved competitiveness
vis-a-vis Automotive Industries,
the oldest trade joürnal; for example, co-sponsors round-
table discussions to smooth out differences between various
industry .. 36 1Tl .... __ ..I-1... __l.lJ'::1e l-He1.
constituted a multi-faceded network that was designed to
overcome inherent deficiencies of markets and hierar-
chies. 37 Although astrang collective commitment for more
efficiency in the production process can be detected, the
34 " ...
1... __
invited about .,(){){) supplier -'- come -'-\Jl'1 H.::!::> L;UlIlI l-O l-O
Detroit in 1\ __ " , .c: 1 no ,. (I rOll 1\ n ,. oe \fi'pl. ..l-L 01.. 1. "joo t-\ge ~-()-O~Ji
35 Gl.f I s
of 12 key-
rc;tating in
BOC division plans to form a supplier council
suppliers and 12 other suppliers who will be
their office {Sorge 1985: 8) ..
36 At the 1984 roundtable the trade organization of
the steel serVlce centers, the stee]. Service Center
Institüte, squared off with the AIAG on the issue of
schedüle stability~ For their own supply schedules the
steel service centers called for more predictable demand
levels dl- the car makers. Both groups were extremely
critical of the lack of support that comes from the steel
mills irl JIT implementation {AlltC)illC't. Ind. 9-85: '61-62) .
37 The increased possibilities for closer
collabora t ion als;.] depend Ul1 changes lf"t the ant i -trllS t
enforcement. J.J! the past anti-trust charges have been
pressed against certain practices between suppliers and
assemblers (Nelson 197fl). Under the Reagan Administration
the Department of Justice began to encourage joint ventures
and joint R&D activities (~.JYT 2-16-84) ..
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asymetrical distribution of power in favor of the assembler
justifies the "forced l!etwork" (Benson 1975) .
for instance, of cooperation has been
supplemented by a penalty system for defective parts. In
addition to the customary reimbursement for defective parts
a supplier was required to pay up to $ 5 per part, if more
than two percent of 'L.. ..: __ ...J ~ , ..: ~. -.. _.... ...J..:..J _ ~ ~lLI-::; Ut::-.LLVt::L Y Ul-U llU L find the approval
of quality inspection (Purchasing 31-1-85: 36E1).
On the other hand, Ford's quality .-.~~--,..: .... _~::>UPP-L-Lt::l::> have been
ho~nored with the "Q 1 Preferred Quality Reward" {Automotive
~~ews 11- 2 6-1984 : Not surprisingly, there was still a
great deal of mistrust on the part of suppliers toward
t'hese _-CUL the the traditional
relationship /,-, ... 1 _ 1 (\0') .. ~~..:..:..: .. TT_~ __ .-. 1 (\0 A\\L.v--=...e -.L~O.J; V_L-L_Li fl.::Iye:::> J_":JOJf}.
While the implementation of the JIT principle requlres a
closer collaboratiün between the suppliers and
A strike even at a small supplier has the potential
lers,
~..: ---L. LU[l~ •
it also presuppüses cooperative ":_...J~~~~_":_l _ ..... 1 ....J_!lU,U:Jl..L-Ld-L l.e-Ld-
of shutting down an entire assernbly plant.
The strategie positiün of individual supplier plants becarne
Within two







T T J\ T.T
Ul1.W
the Tviirlsbu.rg
...J _ ~ __
Ud.y::>
inevident
four of ChrysJ_er's eight assembly plants had to be closed
dowrl (I n teru.3 t. ional Her d_ld Tr ibune 11- 4 - 8 3) Anot.her case
was the strike of the Canadian UAW branch .:_ 1 (\OA-.Ll1 l.~Olf. This
walk-out. of about 36,000 workers __ ~ .. __ ..J ..... 'L.._L:ct u:::oeu, L.!le lay-
off of 40,965 warkers at 30 GM plants li! t.rle u. S . A" (~..Jew
York m": ~1.. --.LH1e~ 10-27-84: I,9:5) TTJ\T.T'_Ul1.W ::> first use of










































~TTT"1 -;-""T'+~aTJa_lXEll!!7~t:. \L·VITT .1..1.:vB61-vl:-6
Il. 18 not difficult to lmaglne _... L........ .'1-':_WIIGll. l.lL1.::;
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increased leverage
for organized labor would have meant during the period of
shopfloor militancy. In fact, labor's militancy was one of
the reasons why automotive manufacturing became geographi-
cally more decentralized in the postwar period. Wl'lile
as a conglomerate of differerlt car manufacturers,
L. __
11d::>
always been more ...l ..... ...__ l.: __ ...luel,;elll. .l d.LJ..z,eu, Ford's and Chrysler's
-,-_.~
P.L(H1l.::> were
L.. .......... __ .: , ._
UedV.L.LY co:ncentrated in Detroit area.
Ford's River Rouge complex may even be called the grandaddy
of "Just-In-Time" production: : .....Ll. concentrated all aspects
of T:' __ ..J'_r VI. u. ~ auto production, from _ ........... , _ ..... 1 • .: __::> l. e e .LHld ..... .L!l lJ ta final
assembly, ...:- ..... _..:_-,-..1.11 a ~ ...l..l!Y _Le location . Lacking today's computer
sopt1istication,
in current JITcourse, - _....llU l. as nicely
different productioll
tune as
steps _ ...... ..... Lwe!.e, lJ.L
plants; At its peak this huge complex emplüyed 87,000
cnnOUU, renown










, (l A \
.L \J '± I T ....J. l.. \-vas t.l'le :home of
L ..... __ .:..... _.:,..: ...... _
.LU!. .Ll..::> HlJ..L.L l.d!!CY
(Meier and Rudwick C A \'{) -'-i i • Former of Ford
Pt1ilip ,.,~l ....J lll~C'-.LUWe.LL .L..~ • __ ~ __ ..J~ .~...... l:'_~1.11~ .pu~ L.-Wctl. l~.;.ecelll-l. d...Li~o_-
tion was a deliberate strategy to keep newly unionized
warkers dispersed as much as passible
Today, management apparently rules out a resurgence of
union _..: 1': .~_~ __HlJ...LJ.. "dUCy • Al tl'10l1gh ___ l':_~.': __ct.p'p i l.l..; d l . ..L U.l! of .L.. _ 'Tml.lle v 1. l













!!leHU) e.l::> W.L.L J. even L._ve more
.L.._~_.__ -.....J
l.Il.l ed l.ellt::'l.l by foreign







__ .... ...J •• _
p1- UlÄuce1..:'--j, it lS I10t wi t110üt ~l ..... ~__ ...... :'._~ ....d.Ll.e.lI1O.l.J..Vt::'::> • The cast
savings of JIT can be substituted by the international wage
d_ifferentials, -. -. _ .: ~ 1 1 __t::'::>peC.LO.LJ_Y .: 1-...': __-LII 1. e ....Lcll. J_lJIl to newly industria-
lizing countries. In fact, at the same time the Big Three
in t radtlce "JllS t- Irl-T ime 11 _....d '_ their domestic plants, they
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criteria for the select.ion of these to be laid-off 15
accepted l...._ .. -..11 _':.-l .... _ 46vy d-l-'- ::>-lUI::'::>.
Through the legalistic enforcement of these rules by means
of the grievance procedure, _____ .... .L- ... _Hictl1d~eHU:~!ll. Wct~ fürther locked
into the rigidities of these practices. In the past, when
all suppliers of the similar restrictions
and long production runs were common, job control unionism
did not represent a major threat to the economic prosperity
of domestic manufacturers. It had proven to be a workable
mechanism for coordinating the ...J':LL __ ~_.L­l.J..iL.l..el.ellL. interest of
capit.al and 1 .... l.... .... _...LclUVL • The new competitive environment has
made management increasingly
union structures and modes of work control.
Beginning in the early seventies some of the automakers
started to exper imerl t wi t.h Circles and team work
approaches~ Trle crisis .... L 1 nn1 11 nn"lUl ~ ':'01../ i ~OL. led to an intensifica-
tion of the efforts to redefine industrial relations, but
so far a complete overhaul of the traditional system has
yet to be achieved~
The resistance to change originated in many quarters.
Foremen are anXlOUS not to 100se their old prerogatives
(Dr"liCker 1 no "')1..":J 0 -J , eole 1985: 106), plant supervisors are quite
often tempted to revert to the old way if short-term ga ins
look promising; and of coürse the workers
__ ..J
dllU the ir tin ion
feared to loose their hard-won rights~ Accordirlgly ttle
story of -------~-_... .:_-.L eUlljd.l!.l..L.c1l. ..LlJ!l of ..: _ ...J •• _ ... _.: .-.,-1.1JUUb L.L ..l.ct...L --~,_ .... .:_-~11::'-ldL-lVII::i in
American _ ..... ~~_1....:,_a U L U lL! lJ ,) -l -'- I::' industry lS __ _ ~ LUl1e U L halting beginnings
followed,
plants ..
and elften exper imerl ts l... __vy firms and
46 For a disctlSsiollS of the pros
system, ~ee Doeringer and Piore









r"_L ._ IJ\~~.-.. "),..,
0ClI'='I.I.'='I./fiUL.U J/
The major problems transformation towards more
flexible arId participa.tory .:_.....l •• _ ••_.:_,J...l1t..4.U~ L 1. ..Ld._L relations face seem
to arise from a} of institutionalization both in
and throughout the political system .~_.....l __UllU'=' 1. which American
1T:t.....l __ ~1 r"_L 1nOJl ... 0"') 0,..,\ .....l L) -'-1..._\~ r l...l d.! 1 t...l ,.:> C 11 e 1. l e l .1.., 0 -'±; 0 .:} - 0 I J (in l...l l.J 1.11 e
combirlatioIl ()f _____ •__ • .:. ":.Ll-".JlJ 1''=' 1. d L· -'- V '=' W -'- l.l! distributive modifications
(Altshuler et al 1984: " 0 1 \L- Q 1. J •
a) The institutional relations between capital and labor
established -LI1 distinguish them-





VI. decentralization and fragmentation.
Because of the pronounced resistance of American capital to
macro-economic conceptions l.e .. the recognition that
union playa socially useful role - as weIl as the liberal,
anti-interventionist tradition of
_._. .....l
::>l.O.l.'=' dllU their own
---,-._._._..:_.
V U--l.. Ul1 La.!..!..~ l. tradi tiü:n, tirllons have
L _
.)eel1 only
rudimentary institutionalized lD the political system ..









.L~ .. _..: • ~ __
L..ue Ull...l..Ull:::; we1. e l1U
langer able to reverse .L~ ._~ __ .: 1.~_.: .&. .L~":_t.u.e pl.UljLe~;::)...LVe weCU\.ell . .Ll1lj UL l.11e...L1.
legal whicfl occuring as





~._.:_-- ---- .-llil-LUll~ :::;et:::HL LU
(p iore 1 no "') ....l'10.); 1 0 \J.. U J T_ .&. __ •.1.11 LdCl..;
against the attempts of employers • __ •• _1_': ••L __ ~ __l.U ex'p..l..U..L L Ll1e llew
balance of power lrl .L_ __._1._.t . .I.1e HLd.l J\. e l. place for cancelling
collective bargaining agreements unilaterally.
conditions organized labor in the U9S~ lacks the ability to
.:_.&.1 •• .L_
.lU 1. .l. Ul;:;1IC,=, L.Il'=' restructüring of a particular .:_.....l~~_. _.lll U U;:' L. 1. Y
through the state which can be found among their European
cou_nterparts (Ross and G()urevitcf1 1984) ~
r"': _
~'J..Llll";t::: unions depend heavily for
__ •• .....l , __ .: • ..:~ _
pl_JWe1. ctll'-.l ..l..elj...i.. t . ...l..1HdCY,
_ L .: __ L __ L' ._~1_ • .: _
\..';.U.•:1!lye~ -LII ~ltlU.t' L..l.UU1. .Le...Ldl. ..L1..JIl~
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bear the risk of endangering the survival of their organi-
zations .. for ...... .. -~- , ~ -~lI.dHlt'-L~, d unic"t!J agrees to the broaderüng
of job classifications and to a less rigid enforcement of
the lines of demarcation its members might no langer feel
1f, then, the warkers com-
plaints are handled by company or jointly selected "team
le.ö-clers" , shop stewards _..: _I- +-HLl ~!! L. become dispensable in
eyes of the unIon members .. The same holds true for
loosening the seniority system ln exchange for more job
In the absence of legally mandated codetermina-
+-..: -. +-._ •• _ ......... ... 1-_
l...,. ..L\Jll :,:) l.l. UC L. UL t:::::> c,lle Ürl i 011 risk that once coopera-
tion has undermined its legitimacy, management will try to
get rid of it all together (Mroczkowski 1984: C J' \J OJ .. T __ ... _1. 11 ::> UHI,
while more clan-like labor relations seem to require for
their stability some support through the state hierarchy,
the American political system denies the unions institutio-
nal safegllar;.is .. The- skepticism of American unions against
more flexible forms _-ClJ L -~,_.&-..:_-~L ~-Ld L 1-'-'11::, seems .&- ..... 1-._t.u ;.)e
justified from this perspective~
1981/1982, in t r üd~ljC ti ()11




__ • .&- ..... __ lF __ ~
ct u l,. t"..; UI ct l\. e 1. ~
severe receSSlon _-CUL
of more flexibility into 1-. ~._ ~ _ __ _ ~ ....... ~_ ~ _ ~" ~ ~ _ .&- ..: _ _ ~ .. ..:.&- 1-. _11UH!.d.11-1.~::::>UUl.\-.:e c1....L.l...lJCc1l.,lVli W...Lt.. lI d.
reduction in wage levels. Obviously the strategy of taking
dollars from the pockets of workers contradicts
attempts to elicit their cooperation for
design of the labor process~ r'I":~~__ .&-L..~ ~.&- .&-1-. _L .&-1-._\J_LVtl! C1!~ b L.L t!!1.J L.i! VI- L.ll~
UAW, particularly in _~~ __ 1-.'~_O.;":::>~HlU-LY , "strategie ct.")nfusit.")n"
(Kat.z arId Sabel 1985) led generally to giving priority to
temporary wage reductions at of ":_~.&-':.&- •• .&-:_--'.LU::> L. -L l. U L. -LUlld-L
changes
.ln labor __ '_.4-': __ ~_L e....La L. .lU1J~ .. Despit.e ~.__ • ..J __ .&-~..JUlJllL ecet..lelJ l.t::Cl
levels of lay-offs, 47 tr1e companles extracted mainly
monetary conceSSlons on .4-L.. __ ~.&-.: __ ~, , __ ~_,t.llt tld.l. ..l.\Jl1o;-:I__t J...tve..l, .. Irl the erlSl1lrlY
47 The emplc;ymerlt. of prc)d.u.ctiorl w(jrkers ir! the auto
indüstry dropped from a peak of 802;800 in December 1978
to 487,700 in JaniJary 198.3 (Altshuler et al 1984: 275) .
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recovery, the UAW managed to res tore ___ ~+- _LIn,.):.::> l. U L i ts m()netary
concessions except for tlle Ann üal Improvemen t Factor (AI F)
which apparently has been given üp for good in exchange of
profit sharing schemes.
t~everth.elessI confronted with the "logic" of the market
place I bat tered.
l.. __
J..J Y a severe recession; - - -'cUIU lacking the
political might tel borders to foreign producers,
the UAW-leadership and probably the majority of its members
have consented to cooperate with management's drive for
_LL.:_.: ....
I::l-Ll-Cl-l;:'lICY· Although the leadership resisted company-wide
adoption of new personnel practices, they have actively.
promoted experiments 1 1 1 __ .. _1lVCctJ... ieV~..L" Besides giving
for Quality of Work Life programs (Bluestone
1983) I the International has given its blessings to local
work rule changes. Since 1982 the national contracts
frOTfllocalfor_1 1 ~ .-Jct~~uweu
co:mparl~l to prOd1.1Ce vii thOtlt l-._":_~ _~~ ": __ ll ..-'JI::.Llllj 1::'_;')IJVIU.l.Cd..LLY
clisadvarltaged" (Ford.-UAW 1982: 39) ..
Thls departure fr o In. "conrlective bargainirlg" (Katz 1985) 48
opened the door for management to experiment with new forms
af work ----_..:,--_.&-..:_-v!. \jdllJ.. Z,dt.......!..lJ.U. Points of __ .&- ~_ .... 1...~ 1 ~_.&-_elll-LY weLe Li1v~e 'p_tCUll-b
whose workforce were ln a weak bargaining position either
bec'ause a plant shut-down looms due to low levels af demand
or because plans for outsourcing exist .. When the warkers
of ,., ...,' -vl"l ~ plarlt in J\~l ..: __ .&- __..1..l _l.l.lI'::J t-'..Jll, "s üdder!ly get.ting
more coapera.tive with the comparlY" after G1,,1: decided _ ..... .&- .&--11 V l· l. "---}
continue its present model ...... 1... _l.I!I::Ll;:'; "hoping that G1"f will
irlclude thenl in same ot.her flit.üre C03.r program" IT.T _ 1 1 r" .&- __ ..... .&-\Wd...!..--L 0L.l.eel.
Journal 2-14-86) .. TT_~ _nUWl;:'Vl;:'I.; the fact that these changes
usu,ally come abolIt only at. "gur! ---=_.&-"pU . Llll. , _1 ~ .. .-J .....C--LUUl.l::-. their
conditions l~ot surprisingly, workers at ,., ...,' -lJl"l ~
48 &e~ the practice of
oficll cOllt.ract &
local agreements .... -cu
40
Flint plant stopped participating in a two-year-old quality
11-9-1983) ~49
program to
(In terna t. ional
the plarlned layof.f of 1350 w("Jrkers
Although
recent research suggests that more cooperative labor
relations can have a major impact on productivity and eGst
competit.iveness, .4-'1-_ ..:_~.&-.:+-~~+-.: __t....lle ..l.11::)L._L\..-UL.3.\.Jl1 _-CU.L quality does
not. automat.ically in an of the traditional
adversary relationship between labor and management (Katz
et al 1983: 15), Without a corresponding new comprehensive
industrial-relations model, a _ .• _,.:+-~...y. Ucl_J~.l.l-Y circle is "an un-
stable organizational _+-_ •• _+.. •• __ ..&...l-_+-~l-Lut.:CULe l.ildl. lS likely to self-
L • I
l) -'--± I Tt1e reluctarlt
______ .1- _
dl'; C t': 1:1 L all ce of the new organizational forms at
level corresponds with narrow votes on the concession
contracts,50 as weIl as the demonstrated willingness of the
Chrysler workers to for a restoration of homogenous
wage rates ~_~~_ ~1-~.:t!UUll':j l.He In the words of eDle:
"n __ ~.: __ ~ __ ,_ .... ~~ __ .... 1-_ 1- __ -l _~':~1- .:_.c~ ... ~.: __ ~_ ~1-_
Dt~cll.i..lllJ t-_~Hlpluyee~ ".;veL L.lle lle.:::tlJ. W--l~.... 11 ..l..tl.LUl. lUd l._LUll \J!l l.llt:
,.-.--.l..\J~:;j
___ lp_~_
lUd L !\. e t.;;j
__ .J
cHIU jobs to foreign companies
simply won't get us very far" 1 0 8) .
III labor rela-
t.iOflS seem ~~ .. - - .- .: - - - ~ ~ .:-expl::1. J... Hlell L.~ ...LU -_ .. -, --~~l!eW p..Lctl1t...::i,. At. tl'1e l~ew
United Motors Manufacturing Inc~ h.TTT...nIT \\1" '-' 1'1I'1.l. i 1
in T:'l ~_~I" .1 ellIU.ill. , for GM's Saturn project -'-1.. _l..i 1 e
IJniorl has to quite --~ ... ~, .. ~.: -.- -_ .....1. eVl.J...Lt,=-t. ...LU!!dl y '~L.. ..... _ •__ ,_ ....... ..:_. __J_ cl ~J \J 1 lei.. d l. --ll_J!! ~
practices in exchange for
collective bargaining agent (Altsfl 1 1er et al 1984: 280,
Fish.er 198~J; •• .cl
-'--± -'--± 1../ ..
49 For ffi()re examples, see Parker (1985: 63-67)
Slaughter lists cases in which plants were closed despite
of extensive conceSSlorlS (1983: 57-58)
was
50 At Gt~ the Vf)te for acceptirlg trle
only 52 per t"]ent {Balar~ce anel Sinclair
company's
1 no"" a n...,\
J_ "':J O.:J; "':J .~! ..
Insulated from the crushing __ ~':_1...~We...i..~.il t· _LUL the Saturn
project encompasses many features that are supposed to
introduce more flexibility and cooperation into human-
resource allocation. Job classifications are abolished,
the different crafts are combined in two general classifi-
cations, and wages are tied to performance~ Although the
union will _ ~._.:_ .1...-..LeLd_.l..fl Lue .._ .: _1-. ~ ~ _1. ...L~JI t. l.U has agreed tt")
decision making based on consensus instead of formal
1... .:_.: __
>Jd1. Yd_ULUIY. Therefore GM's old hierarchy of bosses will
give way to management-union committees on all levels of
(tee is iOll mak ing T.T_ ~ 1.wt'I:'.i<. 8-5-1985: 65f)
Concessions at these new plants wilJ_ put pressure on the
IJAW to allow for similar procedures in other plants
1 no '). 0\
J..":JO_J~ 0; ~ Already the union has been approached by Ford
__ ..J
cHIU Chrysler agree tü cOlnpararile
their respective
{r,.farce 110 1985: 14)
new pr()jects "J\1-h-"1-\.L'p1 cl. __ ..J "T"':1-.~ ........ __ "1~!!Ci L...i..J.)t:::.L l·Y
The features of these new forms of labor relations
__ ..... __ l...1_
Le::-oeHU.J-Le
closely the list of Ouchi's theory Z personnel policies
(l 981: 48f) ~ Theory n _. __ -l_l.J :::> l. cti1l-,t~ for the concept of an all
embracing-clan solidarity
1 ,
.l...ev~.l... of a corporate










forces ----_-.._--~!U.dHd~t!Ht:::!lL. and _, .: 1. ~cLL...i..Ke.
circumstances
_1... _
CIIC1Hljt::: ; collaborative commitment lS
li.kely to The ultimate power still rests with
management who controls the financial means of the organi-
zation. More aptly the new labor relations can be descri-
bed as an expanSlon of the reach of corporate hierarchies
into formerly contractually protected union • .:. 1... ••l.~L1.-Ll-lJ1.Y J..Jy
means of a carrot (shar ing of some -----~-~_.lUdl1dljetiJell L. prerogatives)
and the stick ("outsol)rcirlg l ') ..
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IV~ Discussion and Out look
The discüssion of competitive disadvantages
Amer icarl _~ .. ""' l-":'_ct U l.UIHU.U -.L...!..e industry proves that its traditional
strüctüre lS not compatible with the new competitive
--_.-~---_....... _.&-
ell v -I- L '_JllllleU c • This fact has been recognized by the executi-
On their initiative, as theves of the auto companles~
evidence presented in three case studies -, -- - - , .-CJ_ectL -I-Y
demonstrates, tremendous efforts are under way to transform
the character of the relations among the main agents in the
irldust.ry. Principally, the relationship between assemblers
and suppliers as weIl as between employers and warkers are
t:he focus of t.hese
__ ...J.-. .-. .....
e1.lUectVVL~. Su.ppliers and workers,
however, are reluctant in following the course laid out by
the rnanagement -. ~ - - - ..: - 1 1 __l::'::> pec -I-ctJ..-L'j since dist.ri-
but.ive issues are also --'-..t l. The mectlan. iSl11S
the cooperation seem to be routed lit same processes
• changes necessary . The possibility to
source globally, the potentialities of new ..... -._l-_~l~_._ ~_--lt· t::~.~~ J..l!lU 1- U \j Y; all~.1
the eventuality of econOffilC if trle necessary
changes are not made; force upon _11 .&-_cL.L..L a~~!1 1....::::.
join together in the pursuit of higher productivity, better
workmanship, and
1 -. ..... _
luweL L:\j;;j l.~ ~
Interestingly, this "cooperation in the context of competi-
tion" is organj.zed mainly independently from the political
n._': .&-_l ...... ~1-1..:_l--.--l
r L _'-va (,e_,-y e::> LctlJ ..L-I-::>nel,). __ ...... 1 __!le l.WUL.K.::::; 1- _\~ .. Y ..
committ.ees, teams, action grollps,
councils} represent the vehicles for _l- _Cl.1ct!l~e. They replace
OY sllpplement
coordinattons,
the more legalistic farms of economic
i.e. corporate hierarchies and markets,
were previously prevalent in ':_...J~~_ ..... __ •J ... liUll~ l.L Y .. But
despite the rhetoric of
D.etwt.Jrks, they by a crass
at.~COlnpanles
~ .... _. ..... -.L __ ~ ... __
d.~jYHuael.LY \..lL puwel. 9
Although the assemblers have to rely on
+.1- ..... ..: ..... _
l· 11 e cl t.....: t. -.L V ~ Cl,) U 1:-' e L a -
tion of their slJppliers Ci.nd. v/orkers
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tion of their production process organized around the just-
in-time principle, these two groups can only exert a more
or less obstructionist pressure.
ultimate authority rests with the management _LUL
assembler through their unchallenged control over capital.
Unless restrained by the state, they are free to souree
from. abroad.
In its crlSlS ..:. - .I- .... ~ _ .I_ ..:. ~_~i! LeL V~11l.. _lU!!, the state has 1eft management's
prerogatives Local and state governments have
automakers, fore igll arId domestic,
(Business Week 4-1-1985: 26; LeRoy 1 no I: \1. ~ O.j J • Trle
Federal Government bargained for Voluntary Export
Average Fuel Economy _._ __ -3 __ -3_~ L. d.U eid i. U.::> its -_.I-': ..... _ •• --.+- _ •• "l_ .....Cl11 t, _L - Li. U~ L. L U..l.t::~
(t~ew ~lc}rk Times 2-16-1984) A slight deviation from this
pattern may represent "l .- __..LUd..tl _ •• ~--_.l-~--..lj Ud.1 O.ll t_.et::~ ,.,1...._~~-.,_~\ ..... 11.1 y::-; i-e.1 •
• The Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 placed
the company under the supervision of an independent board
and required the sale concessions from
Chrysler' s ba_nks, suppliers, arId employees (P1lblic Law 96-
, n l:
l 0 ..1 , 1980) . Al thOllgh J\-..I_ ~ ...... .1_1.... .1_ _ ..................l"-\Cl. lJd.ve Lile lJUV~Lll!UelIL veLU
power üver most management the CüTIlpany was
factually free lD investment and product decisiüns
(Reich an(l Donahue 1 no I: •.1...,0.); Tfl0U.gh
publicly justified as an attempt to save jobs, it did not
even make the guarantees conditional to
a specific , ...... _~_, ~..c..LeVei- UL "':'.-1.... -.JU.LJ~) (ibid.: .2 9 6) Ins tead. the " - +-.t1.l'; l-
helped to open the UAW contract and thereby established the
precedent for labor concessions throughüut basic industry
(Slaughter 198.3: , ,,\
.1. \) J •
In assessing the ..c •• .1_ •• ~__ ..... +-~~.I_.:_,L l.t l- U..L e l' l ..; t· eI! l· -.L ct-.l. of the cooperative
efforts in the rJ~S. automobile industry; the
state seems to be of crucial In the absence of
g()VernTIlent. to institutionalize ür _... _--_.1-:> UP!-'Ul. l.
mechanism oi ~...J __ .&-': __d.Ud.}/L--l\.JII, ---, ~.- +- - ~---VU-LUl1l.dl.Y
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programmes are
likely t.o be subject.ed t.o the vagaries of shifting balances
of power. Given a track record of shart-range planning,
remains to be seen whether the auto management can sustain
a cooperative momentum over a longish period~ Workers have
reasons ta As long as the managers of
corporate hierarchies retain complete control over invest-
ment decisions, the present shift away from hierarchical
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